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=============================================================================== Robb Kambic Unidata Program Center Software Engineer III Univ. Corp for Atmospheric Research address@hidden WWW: http://www.unidata.ucar.edu/ =============================================================================== ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 16:16:25 -0400 From: Ted Jackson <address@hidden> To: Pete Pokrandt <address@hidden> Subject: Re: SGI security problem with telnetd. TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION!! (fwd) I can't say for all versions, but some versions of Irix, if the /.rhosts file contains the "+ +" line as shown below, will also allow any user to 'su' without prompting for a password at all. Ted Jackson On Tue, 15 Aug 2000, Pete Pokrandt wrote: Hi all, Kinda off topic, but I know lots of folks run the ldm on SGI machines and I wanted to provide a heads-up for this vulnerability. Exploit scripts are easily available, so this should be fixed ASAP. Pete ------- Forwarded Message Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 13:09:22 -0500 Subject: SGI security problem with telnetd. TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION!! Please read this mesage carefully if you are responsible for the administration of an SGI workstation connected to the Internet!! SGI has acknowledged a security problem with the telnetd on all SGI systems running IRIX (SGI Security Advisory, Number: 20000801-01-A). The text of this announcement is attached for your information. Please take immediate action: Check your system for this intrusion. Use cat to see the content of the /.rhosts file (if it exists): cat /.rhosts If the output contains one or more lines like "+ +", delete the file immediately! Disable the telnetd immediately!! Here is how to do that: - ---- Disabling telnetd daemon will disable the telnet service. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Edit the file /etc/inetd.conf (for IRIX 5.3 and lower, edit /usr/etc/inetd.conf) with your favorite text editor. Place a "#" as the first character of the line to comment out and deactivate the telnetd daemon. # vi /etc/inetd.conf {Find the following line} telnet stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/telnetd telnetd {Place a "#" as the first character of the telnet line} #telnet stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/telnetd telnetd {Save the file} 3) Force inetd to re-read the configuration file. # /etc/killall -HUP inetd 4) Kill any existing telnetd process. # /etc/killall telnetd 5) Return to previous level. # exit % - ----- Check your system log file (/var/adm/SYSLOG) for suspicious entries. I will get back to those later. Please check our web site for more on this (www.nmrfam.wisc.edu/Varsity/Support). We will update this page as soon as we learn more about the intrusions. I have included the Security announcement from SGI as an attachment. [204.94.214.22]) by siri.nmrfam.wisc.edu (980427.SGI.8.8.8/980728.SGI.AUTOCF) via ESMTP id SAA75843 for <address@hidden>; Mon, 14 Aug 2000 18:45:40 -0500 (CDT) pneumatic-tube.sgi.com (980327.SGI.8.8.8-aspam/980310.SGI-aspam) via ESMTP id QAA08137; Mon, 14 Aug 2000 16:51:01 -0700 (PDT) mail_from (address@hidden) (980427.SGI.8.8.8/970903.SGI.AUTOCF) id PAA23977 for wiretap-outgoing; Mon, 14 Aug 2000 15:13:37 -0700 (PDT) relay1.corp.sgi.com (980427.SGI.8.8.8/970903.SGI.AUTOCF) via ESMTP id PAA22577 for <address@hidden>; Mon, 14 Aug 2000 15:13:36 -0700 (PDT) (980427.SGI.8.8.8/970903.SGI.AUTOCF) id PAA79244; Mon, 14 Aug 2000 15:13:04 - -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2000 15:13:04 -0700 (PDT) From: address@hidden (SGI Security Coordinator) Message-Id: <address@hidden> X-Mailer: Z-Mail-SGI (3.2S.3 08feb96 MediaMail) To: address@hidden Subject: IRIX telnetd vulnerability Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: address@hidden - --=====================_966380962==_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="SGI security problem with telne" - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SGI Security Advisory Title: IRIX telnetd vulnerability Number: 20000801-01-A Date: August 14, 2000 ______________________________________________________________________________ SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. SGI recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall SGI be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ SGI acknowledges the telnetd vulnerability reported by LSD on BUGTRAQ and is currently investigating. No further information is available at this time. As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be issued via the normal SGI security information distribution methods including the wiretap mailing list. For the protection of all our customers, SGI does not disclose, discuss or confirm vulnerabilities until a full investigation has occurred and any necessary patch(es) or release streams are available for all vulnerable and supported Unicos, SGI ProPack for Linux and IRIX operating systems. Until SGI has more definitive information to provide, customers are encouraged to assume all security vulnerabilities as exploitable and take appropriate steps according to local site security policies and requirements. The steps below can be used to disable IRIX telnetd daemon, if needed. ================ **** NOTE **** ================ Disabling telnetd daemon will disable the telnet service. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Edit the file /etc/inetd.conf (for IRIX 5.3 and lower, edit /usr/etc/inetd.conf) with your favorite text editor. Place a "#" as the first character of the line to comment out and deactivate the telnetd daemon. # vi /etc/inetd.conf {Find the following line} telnet stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/telnetd telnetd {Place a "#" as the first character of the telnet line} #telnet stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/telnetd telnetd {Save the file} 3) Force inetd to re-read the configuration file. # /etc/killall -HUP inetd 4) Kill any existing telnetd process. # /etc/killall telnetd 5) Return to previous level. # exit % - - ----------------------------------------- - - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts --- - - ----------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to address@hidden. ------oOo------ SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ . For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to address@hidden. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail address@hidden subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress> end ^d In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ . ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to address@hidden or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBOZhs5rQ4cFApAP75AQE+xQP/SjH4vRPrsJrNcG5Zpen5sEyXU6tMmPDA 4cfMe1Cc02FN2ruXjstnwdSdydA1A0YEaPmM6tnDQSoLsQYDTSlEYJBEWVb44kgu 6XX/5W2bYTyf6txgQMGRi+88Tsn/pNY1GpbU8atDjxlJg9+u0ELhHvaG/vki8bEq hCNhXygoSUE= =x87X - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --=====================_966380962==_-- ------- End of Forwarded Message